A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides security services such as confidentiality, authentication, and nonrepudiation for communications protocols. SSL, IPsec and SMIME use certificates provided by a PKI for realtime secure messaging, the essential service for electronic transactions. While it is a relatively straight-fonuard exercise to build a PKI on a LAN, this paper examines the issues associated with the more complicated PKI deployment on the Canadian Forces' Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN).
Introduction
The Canadian Forces (CF) plans to deploy an Entrustbased Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) by the middle of 2000. The infrastructure will be deployed on the Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN), a common data communications backbone network interconnecting the heterogeneous Local Area Networks (LANs) and Metropolitan Area Networks (MANS) within the Department of National Defence (DND).
The problem with the deployment of a PKI on a WAN is mainly associated with configuration. Each possible topological installation has a set of advantages and disadvantages in terms of network traffic, human resources, actual dollar costs, and manageability.
The integration of the DWAN and the Entrust PKI requires detailed study to ensure a successful deployment. Each possible configuration scheme has network traffic load, cost, and complexity impacts. In order to test various possibilities, an accurate model must first be built that reflects the current state of the DWAN. Once this model is complete, various PKI configurations can be modeled, and the impact on the DWAN can be documented and measured.
This paper introduces the basic components of a PKI, examines possible deployment options for the infrastructure's deployment on the DWAN, and presents performance, cost, and complexity results for each scheme. 
Public Key Infrastructure
A Public Key Infrastructure (PIU) is defined to be a comprehensive system providing public-key encryption and digital signature services and includes the set of services that allow the use and management of keys, certificates and policies [3] . A PKI forms one part of a network security system. It uses public and symmetric-key cryptography, digital signatures, hash functions and timestamps to protect and verify the integrity of data. Nonrepudiation can be achieved using digital signatures and time-stamps, providing proof of origin and time of existence for a document. The PKI must have a comprehensive policy in place so that public keys can be associated with a particular community and application class. This policy applies to each user to whom a particular public key is bound, and it specifies how and when an entity may use the PIU services.
Public Key Cryptography
Symmetic-key cryptography uses the same key for encryption and decryption of information. This key must first be exchanged over a secure channel before the communicating parties can send encrypted data over an unsecure channel. The disadvantage of needing this secure channel, coupled with the number of keys required for transactions between multiple users, led to the introduction of Public-key cryptography in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA). The RSA Cryptosystem is based on the idea of using a key pair for encryption and decryption, and was first presented by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [4] .
In a public-key system, each entity has both a public and private key used to encrypt and decrypt data. Public keys can be exchanged on an open channel prior to the commencement of communications. The keys can be used in either order, i.e. if data is encrypted with a public key, the corresponding private key has to be used for decryption, and vice-versa. The disadvantages of publickey cryptography include slower performance and larger keys than symmetric cryptosystems. The solution to these problems is to use the two schemes together. A key is selected for a symmetric encryption scheme such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the message is encrypted. The originator obtains the recipient's public key and uses it to encrypt the symmetric key. This encyphered key is then included with the message and sent. The recipient is the only one able to decrypt the symmetric key using the corresponding private key, and the document is decrypted using the recovered symmetric key that was used for encrypting the original message.
Digital Signatures and Time Stamps
To produce a digital signature, a public one-way hash function is first applied to the message, producing a short message digest. This digest is encrypted with the sender's private key, and included with the original message to the recipient. The corresponding public key is used by the recipient to decrypt the message digest, and the hash function is applied again to produce an independent digest of the received message. The two digests will match if the message hasn't been altered during transmission. Since the sender is the only one with access to the private key, the recipient now knows who sent the message and that the integrity of the message hasn't been compromised. Digital signature schemes can be used with or without the original message being encrypted.
In cases where it is necessary to prove that some particular data existed at a given point in time, a process called time-stamping is used. The originator sends the hash of a message to a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) where the current Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) is appended to the message and everything is re-hashed. The TSA signs the new message digest and returns it to the originator who now has proof that the original text existed at the indicted date and time. It is necessary to have a secure and reliable source of time for the TSA, such as a satellite or radio receiver. A modem to a trusted time source or the use of several trusted Internet time-servers can also be used.
Certificate Authorities
The main threat to the public-key scheme is the wellknown "Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)" attack. Since the public keys are stored in a location that is accessible to anyone, an adversary can gain control of this site and intercept all message traffic. When a legitimate user requests the public key of an intended recipient, the adversary returns a public key for which he holds the corresponding private key. The originator encrypts his message and sends it, unaware that it will be intercepted and decrypted by the adversary. The original message is encrypted again by the adversary, using the public key of the intended recipient, and neither of the two legitimate . .. entities knows about the intrusion. Any traffic in either direction can thus be intercepted, decrypted and read, and re-encrypted properly before being forwarded.
The solution to this problem is to make use of a trusted Cdfication Authority (CA). A certificate in a PKI is the binding of some user information with their public key, signed by the CA. The certificate standard for a PKI is the X.509 v3 certificate, and it defines data formats and procedures related to the distribution of public keys via certificates. Information on a certificate includes the user's name, (in the form of a Distinguished Name (DN)) the user's public key, the validity period of the certificate, and the purpose of the public key [5] . The CA's signature verifies that the certificate has not been tampered with, and that it can now be stored on a publicly accessible X..500 directory, called a Directory Server Agent @SA). A X.500 directory system uses the DNs of the user and of the issuer to uniquely identify each certificate. To send an encrypted message, an originator must first acquire the certificates for each intended recipient, and validate these certificates using the CA's public key.
A certificate may be revoked for any one of several reasons, and the serial numbers of these certificates are stored in Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) within the dkctory. When a new user is initialized on a PKI, the CA generates the key-pair used for encryption and decryption, creates the public key certificate and stores it in the DSA, and securely sends the private key to the user by using a secure exchange protocol. The private key is also backed up in an encrypted database and archived so that data can be recovered after a certificate is no longer valid or has been revoked. The certificate lifetimes are determined by the policy for the PIU, and certificates are automatically replaced and backed up by the CA, transparent to the user. Another set of keys is required for digital signatures, since the private signing key should never be available to anyone but *e rightful owner. Each user generates their signing key pair and forwards the public key to the CA to produce a verification certificate. These are archived for as long as the PIU policy dictates.
PKI Deployment Options
The three main PKI components described in the pre'vious section introduce several types of messages on a network. n e C A , DSA, and TSA can be located at any point on a network, and there could be several of each, depending on the sizt of the organization and the performance constraints of the configuration.
A CA deals with the initialization and management of usel: certificates. The CA signs new certificates and sends them to the user and to the DSA, manages certificate lifetimes based on the PIU policy, and forwards revoked certificate serial numbers to the directories. The users create their own verification keys and send the public portion to the CA for certificate production and dissemination. The DSA handles requests for public key certificates from users, receives and sends updated CRLs, and communicates with the other DSAs to ensure the directory is current. The final type of PIU message occurs when a TSA receives requests for time-stamps from any entity and returns a time-stamp token. All of this network activity will have an effect on the available bandwidth, and therefore performance and cost.
The Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN)
The DWAN uses a leased line frame-relay backbone to connect over thirty main routers to each other through two central switching systems at CFB Borden and Tunney's Pasture, Ottawa. These routers, called Integrated Service Access Points (ISAPs), are found at each of the bases and units across Canada and have connections to the DWAN backbone using lines with capacities ranging from 56K to TI. ,The DWAN topology, as it has been modeled using the ComNet simulation package, is depicted in Figure 1 .
Before the PIU can be deployed on the DWAN network, several possible deployment options are tested, examining the consequences of each configuration in a simulation environment.
Deployment Criteria
The main criteria to consider before deploying the PIU on a WAN are network traffic, cost, security and complexity. With three separable components to install (the CA, DSA, and TSA), there are several possible configurations to choose from. To reduce the backbone traffic between the components, it makes sense to COlocate the servers having the highest traffic volumes and install them near the users, leaving only PIU system management traffic on the WAN. CAS can be cross-certified with each other to build a chain of trust when more than one is used. With a potential user base of more than 60,000, several CAS and DSAs should be used. The number of TSAs required will vary, depending on the configuration selected and the PIU policy in place regarding the use of time-stamps.
Deployment Schemes
The two main deployment schemes examined are distributed and centralized. The centralized version matches the current plans of the CF and uses 7 CAS, 7 DSAs, and 1 TSA. All of the CAS are cross-certified with each other and they are designated for use by geographic area. For example, one CA would service the CF bases on the west coast while another administers the prairie provinces, and so on. The DSAs are matched with a CA. Three are physically installed at CFB Borden to handle the western and central regions. One TSA is used, and it is physically located in Ottawa with all of the CAS and the other DSAs.
Several types of distributed configuration are possible. Another hierarchical level of PIU components could be added to the centralized system, physically locating them at each base on the DWAN backbone. A variation of this idea would eliminate most of the centralized PIU components, and each base would have its own PIU set up and cross-certify with all the other bases.
A compromise between network performance, security and cost would use centralized CAS and distributed DSAs and TSAs, as the latter two components handle most of the PKI traffic. Using a few centralized CAS increases the system security, since these critical PIU components would be accessible to only a few personnel in a secure area, and a security breach would be easier to contain.
Simulation of the DWAN
Before the various deployment schemes were tested in a simulation, an accurate model of the DWAN backbone was specified and verified to produce a baseline. The model incorporates the same physical components and operational characteristics of the real system, using actual DWAN peak-hour traffic volumetrics and propagation delays for each of the backbone links. To verify the results, five simulations were run and the standard deviation and confidence levels for each link were captured. Since several possible PIU configurations will have a minute impact on DWAN traffic, the processor utilization at each of the base ISAPs was also measured for comparison with the models incorporating the PIU.
Before the PIU deployment schemes are introduced to the baseline model, the problem of usage variations among each of the bases was resolved. For example, Yellowknife rarely uses the DWAN, while the National Capital Region sees heavy use. The DWAN Engineering Change Proposal message traffic report for 1997 provided guidance [2] . This document describes the amount of Military Message Handling System (MMHS) traffic transmitted and received by each base, including peak hour figures. The PKI models ' wez--sj%x5iied to incorporate a realistic ratio of PIU traffic based on thls concept. The MMHS traffic is also used as a traffic multiplier to proportionately increase PIU traffic from each CF base onto the DWAN. This step provides an indication of how the PKI will affect the network as an increasing number of applications make use of the PKI. 
Centralized Deployment and Results
The first DWAN model tested uses the centralized PIU deployment scheme described in the last section with the traffic multiplier used to introduce increments from one to five times the amount of PIU message traffic. Each multiplication factor was specified by a separate model, and the simulations were run using a 3600 second (one hour) time frame with a 60 second warm-up to bring the traffic flow up to speed before any measurements were taken.
' The results of the simulations for the completely ce:ntralized scheme are shown in Figure 2 . This graph presents the link utilization increases for a sample of CF bases at increasing PIU traffic levels. While the levels appear to be alarming increases up to loo%, they typically represent an increase from a baseline utilization of about 3% to a level of 5%. Since the CF is charged for aclnal bandwidth use, the cost increase resulting from PIU traffic must be considered. 
4.2: Distributed Deployments and Results
Two distributed schemes were modeled and tested under the same conditions. The first incorporated an additional hierarchical layer of PIU components situated at the base ISLP locations. While this deployment drastically reduced DWAN PIU traffic, it would be too difficult to manage without a significant increase in personnel requirements. The second distributed model eliminated --most-cf the centralized components and disperses the PIU cornporiehts.out to the bases, virtually eliminating any increase in DWAXtraffic. The major flaw with these two dislributed schemes is the security threat. The compromise of any one of tile*@uted CAS would destroy the integrity of the entire PKI architecture. The simulation results for the two distributed schemes produced predictable results, in that DWAN traffic was virtually eliminated using all traffic multiplier values.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Deployment Variations
The next phase of modeling adopted the assumption that the five times traffic multiplier is a realistic value for PKI traffic. The first model tested at this traffic level was a different type of centralized deployment using only two CAS, DSAs, and TSAs, one of each at Borden and Tunney's in Ottawa. The resulting DWAN traffic was at the highest values of all tested configurations, but the system would have good CA security and be easiest to manage.
For the CF, a likely PKI configuration would incorporate a combination of the centralized and distributed ideas, using centralized CAS with distributed DSAs and TSAs. Central security and control is maintained for the CAS, and the components (which are accessed by the majority of PIU messages) are distributed to the bases where all requests for certificates and timestamps originate.
The results of using this combination of centralized CAS and distributed DSAs and TSAs are depicted in Figure 3 4 is the centralized version with only two CAS, DSAs and TSAs. The increase in DWAN PKI traffic is virtually eliminated, the system has CA security, and the high traffic components are physically located where they are used.
The successful deployment of a PIU on a WAN requires a careful study of the nature of the target network, and an understanding of the interaction between PIU components. The simplest solution of a centralized installation could produce a significant performance degradation, especially on a WAN that already has high link utilization due to the type of applications in use, the nature of everyday business, or Internet traffic.
A PIU provides essential security services including data integrity, non-repudiation, digital signatures, and data security. More importantly, a PKI associates a unique entity, with their public key in a standard and exchangeable certificate, automatically manages key lifetimes, and archives the necessary keys, based on the PIU policy. This paper has introduced several possible PIU configuration alternatives and explained how the results of each decision can be captured using realistic models of the DWAN. The problem of a variable size population at each base was resolved using the known traffic ratio available from the MMHS message system. While it is possible to drastically reduce WAN PIU traffic using a distributed deployment scheme with the CAS, DSAs, and TSA co-located, the resulting system complexity, personnel and equipment costs, and PIU security flaws would prohibit such a selection.
A likely compromise for the CF is the use of centralized CAS, with the DSAs and TSAs dispersed out to the bases and units. Unlike the fully centralized deployments, DWAN traffic increases are minimal, while the central CA management concept reduces costs significantly and ensures the security of the CAS.
